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More than forty years ago, concluding a survey of Milton’s intellectual development, 
H. F. Fletcher voiced his regret that neither he nor anyone else had yet dealt 
adequately with the topic of Milton’s ‘extraordinary knowledge of legal matters’.  He 
for one was convinced that ‘there is no more fertile field of Miltonic studies 
remaining today than what can be found in the general topic of Milton’s knowledge of 
law, whether or not we circumscribe it by the limiting word, English’.  These were 
large and, if true, important claims.  However, they have never been put to the test, 
with the result that we know very little more now than we did then about Milton’s 
‘highly sentient knowledge of law’ or his ‘constant us of legal material’.1 
 At first sight, of course, what Fletcher was saying appears to fly in the face of 
the evidence.  Indeed, it would be far easier to construct the exactly opposing case and 
demonstrate from Milton’s published writings, early and late, that his detestation of 
the law was such as seemingly to preclude any sustained or detailed engagement with 
it.  Thus in the seventh Prolusion, for example, he derides the dialect of the lawyers 
which resembles ‘no human speech at all’,2 and, in Elegy 1, the ‘barbarous jargon’ of 
the barrister.3  Much later, in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, he scorns those 
who hanker after ‘that old entanglement of Iniquity, thir gibrish Lawes, though the 
badge of thir ancient slavery’.  Rejecting constitutionalism, he celebrates instead 
‘great actions, above the form of Law or Custom’ (3: 193-4).  And later still, in 
Samson Agonistes, the impasse reached when Samson argues the Chorus into 
                                                 
Earlier versions of this chapter were given at conferences at Reading and Durham in 1995, and to a 
seminar in Trinity College, Cambridge in 1996; I am grateful to members of these audiences for their 
helpful suggestions. 
1 H. F. Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John Milton, 2 vols. (Urbana, Ill., 1956-61), II: 530, 
551. 
2 John Milton, Complete Prose Works, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven, 1953-82), I: 301.    
Hereafter cited in the text by volume and page number. 
3 John Milton, ‘Elegia prima ad Carolum Diodatum’, l.32 (Milton, Complete Shorter Poems, ed. John 
Carey (London, 1971), pp. 20, 23). 
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accepting his view that ‘Our law forbids at their religious rites / My presence’, can 
only be resolved by his sudden antinomian impulse to ‘go along’ with the Philistine 
Officer to the temple of Dagon.4 
 The manuscript sources – Milton’s Commonplace Book and the marginalia –
tell the same story, perhaps even more clearly.  A sermon by Savanarola yielded the 
precept ‘that one should obey the spirit rather than the letter of the law’.  An entry 
from John Stow prompted the wish that we could now be ‘rid … of this norman 
gibbrish’.  Alessandro Tassoni’s Pensieri furnished a scathing account of the 
interpreters and lawyers who, ‘bending the sword of justice’, had buried cases beneath 
‘a thousand points of law, a thousand opinions, a thousand judgements’.  As Tassoni 
pointed out, several Italian cities had even proscribed lawyers from public office.  
From Trajano Boccalini, he learned that the kings of Spain had banned lawyers from 
the Indies, and he also agreed with him that the study of law was not a liberal art but 
rather a trade (or mystery: mestiere), a mechanical art invented to afflict the human 
race.  The single detail he highlighted in Tomasini’s life of Petrarch is ‘where young 
Petrarch scorns the study of law’ in favour of poetry (1: 423, 424, 467-9).  Milton 
even fashioned a Petrarchan gesture of his own in the form of the couplet he affixed to 
his copy of Harington’s translation of Ariosto, of which only the following cancelled 
line remains: ‘Tu mihi iure tuo Iustiniane vale’ (‘Farewell, Justinian, with your law 
book’).5 
 Yet this cannot be the whole truth.  According to Tomasini, even Petrarch was 
prepared to distinguish between the professional and the intellectual aspects of the 
law: when he eventually abandoned his legal studies after several years at Montpellier 
and Bologna, this was ‘not because the authority of the law did not please me, which 
is no doubt great and full of Roman antiquity, in which I delight, but because the 
practice of it is corrupted’ (1: 468). Milton was surely capable of equal 
discrimination.  After all, he also noted in the Commonplace Book that ‘Civil law 
favours liberty’ (1: 471).6  And as late as September 1637 he disclosed in a letter to 
                                                 
4 John Milton, Samson Agonistes, ll. 1320-21, 1384 (Shorter Poems, pp. 386, 388). 
5 Milton, Shorter Poems, p. 155.  Cf. Virgil, Aeneid, V. 97.   
6 Quentin Skinner has recently argued that classical moralists and historians – and hence their 
renaissance followers – derived their understanding of freedom and slavery in large measure from the 
Roman law of persons: see Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), especially pp. 39-
41.  For the way in which Milton’s writings are similarly informed by Roman private law, see Martin 
Dzelzainis, ‘Republicanism’, in A Companion to Milton, ed. Thomas N. Corns (Oxford, 2001), pp. 
294-308. 
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his friend Charles Diodati that he was considering a ‘move into some one of the Inns 
of Court’ precisely because of the ‘companionship’ he expected to find there (1: 327). 
 On the principle of better late than never, therefore, the aim of this essay is to 
see to what extent Milton’s knowledge of Roman law bears out Fletcher’s high 
estimate, focusing on a single instance where the point at issue is precisely one of 
what Milton knew and when he knew it.  My point of entry is a passage from The 
Judgement of Martin Bucer, Concerning Divorce (August 1644); that is, Milton’s 
translation of excerpts from De Regno Christi, which Bucer wrote to further the 
reformation under King Edward VI though it was only published posthumously in 
1557 (Milton actually used the 1577 second edition).  A main plank in Bucer’s 
argument for divorce by consent was the contention that the generous allowance that 
the Roman law had made for divorce was fully congruent with the teachings of 
Scripture.  This was true above all of the legislation of Theodosius II and Valentinian 
III, fifth-century emperors of the East and West respectively.  According to Bucer (in 
Milton’s translation), it was  
 
 manifest that the law of Theodosius and Valentinian, which begins Consensu, 
 & c. touching divorce, and many other decrees of pious Emperours agreeing 
 heerwith, are not contrary to the word of God.  And therfore may be recall’d 
 into use by any Christian Prince or Common-wealth, nay ought to be with due 
 respect had to every nation. (2: 462)  
 
In a later chapter, Bucer elaborates and qualifies the point about consent: 
 
 It was permitted also by Christian Emperours, that they who would divorce by 
 mutuall consent, might without impediment.  Or if there were any difficulty at 
 all in it, the law expresses the reason, that it was only in favour of the 
 children, so that if there were none, the law of those godly Emperours made 
 no other difficulty of a divorce by consent.  Or if any were minded without 
 consent of the other to divorce, and without those causes which have bin 
 nam’d, the Christian Emperours laid no other punishment upon them, then that 
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 the husband wrongfully divorcing his wife should give back her dowry…  (2: 
 469) 
 
Milton here faithfully reproduces the tenor of the original – with one crucial 
exception: after ‘without impediment’, he omits the phrase ‘sed eam concessionem 
Iustinianus rursus sustulit’7 (‘but this concession Justinian later recalled’) in which 
Bucer disclosed that the Theodosian law on divorce by consent (Code, V.17.8) had in 
fact been repealed by the sixth-century Emperor Justinian in Novella 117.  Not only 
does Milton suppress this inconvenient fact, but he also compounds the offence by 
substituting a passage in italics (used throughout by him to signal his departures from 
Bucer’s text) which actually reiterates the provisions of the very law which Justinian 
had revoked.8 
 Now it is certainly true that the fact of revocation mattered much more to 
Milton that it did to Bucer.  For Bucer, just as subsequent revocation could not detract 
from the essential equity of the Theodosian law, so it could in no way hinder its later 
reintroduction.  He could thus assure Edward VI that while he was ‘not bound to the 
imperial law, yet it is the duty of a Christian King to embrace and follow what ever he 
knows to be any where piously and justly constituted’ (2: 445).  For Milton, however, 
Justinian’s action represented a fatal breach in the historical pattern.  Like Bucer, 
Milton wanted to attribute the idea of marriage as indissoluble – that ‘pernicious 
entanglement to distressed consciences’ – wholly to the ‘the invention of Antichrist’ 
(2: 446-7).  But it was difficult to maintain that ‘Popery and superstition’ alone had 
‘attempted to remove and alter divine and most prudent Laws for human and most 
imprudent Canons’ if there was one outstanding secular ruler, Justinian, who had 
done just that (2: 438).  Even so, Milton does appear to have played fast and loose 
with Bucer’s prose and, as a way out of the quandary, expediently omitted the phrase 
altogether. 
                                                 
7 Martini Bucer Scripta Anglicana, ed. C. Hubert (Basle, 1577), p. 121. 
8  In the italicized passage, Milton is expanding upon the Latin of Code V.17.8: ‘solutionem etenim 
matrimonii difficiliorem debere esse favor imperat liberorum’ (Corpus Iuris Civilis, eds. P. Krueger, T. 
Mommsen, R. Schoell, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1954), 2: 212; for the identical text in the Codex Theodosianus, 
see Theodosiani libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis: et leges novellae ad Theodosianum 
pertinentes, eds. T. Mommsen and P. M. Mayer, 2 vols. in 3 (Berlin, 1954), 2: 29). 
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 This is in itself might not matter so much were it not for the extraordinary 
status of Bucer’s text.  For what makes Milton’s departure so noteworthy is the 
remarkable significance which Milton himself attached to the coincidence between his 
views and those of Bucer.  This is indeed the main theme of the exultant epistle to 
Parliament prefixed to Martin Bucer: one of the most revealing of all Milton’s 
autobiographical excursions, it also deserves to be recognized as a classic expression 
of the puritan doctrine of providence.  On the one hand, that is, Milton insists on the 
fruits of his own ‘severe industry and examination of my self’.   He had worked out 
the arguments in the first edition of his first divorce tract, The Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce (August 1643), with ‘no light, or leading receav’d from any man in the 
discovery of this truth’, having only the ‘infallible grounds of Scripture to be my 
guide’.  The precise moment at which he came across helpful suggestions in the 
writings of Grotius and Fagius during the final stages of composing the 1643 Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce and just after its publication are scrupulously recorded, the 
upshot being that it was therefore ‘not as a lerner, but as a collateral teacher’ that he 
eventually encountered Bucer’s work ‘wel-nigh three months’ after the second edition 
of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce appeared early in February 1644.  On the 
other hand, Milton is more than prepared to concede that, ‘if it be in mans discerning 
to sever providence from chance’, then his role throughout could be characterized as 
having been that of ‘no other then a passive instrument under some power and 
counsel higher and better then can be human’.  Thus the ‘sympathy of judgment’ 
between them was no mere chance but rather a signal instance of the workings of 
providence (2: 433-6).  For 
 
 if we know at all, when to ascribe the occurrences of this life to the work of a 
 special providence, as nothing is more usual in the talk of good men, what can 
 be more like to a special providence of God, then in the first reformation of 
 England, that this question of divorce, as a main thing to be restor’d to just 
 freedom, was writt’n, and seriously commended to Edward the sixt, by a man 
 call’d from another Countrey to be the instructer of our nation, and now in 
 this present renewing of the Church and Common-wealth, which we pray may 
 be more lasting, that the same question should be again treated and presented 
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 to this Parlament, by one enabl’d to use the same reasons without the lest 
 sight or knowledge of what was done before. (2: 437) 
 
Milton was in no doubt that it was God who had ‘directed him to the forgott’n 
Writings of this faithfull Evangelist’ which he now tendered to the Lords and 
Commons ‘as from a divine hand’.  And he clearly expected that this provenance, the 
fact that the doctrine had been ‘twise born’ in so notable a fashion, would of itself do 
much top bring about ‘the convincment of a pervers age’ (2: 436, 438). 
 The dilemma is therefore acute.  On the one hand, Milton’s discovery and 
translation of Bucer’s work was divinely ordained – indeed, nothing short of special 
providence could have overcome Milton’s deeply-ingrained reluctance to appeal to 
the authority of another author.  By the same token, however, tampering with Bucer’s 
text so as to procure an apparent ‘sympathy of judgment’ would constitute a more than 
ordinary betrayal of the translator’s trust and take on an aspect of outright impiety. 
 All this is deeply disturbing to the Yale editor, Arnold Williams.  Though it is 
difficult to see it as anything else, he is anxious to acquit Milton of intellectual 
dishonesty, contending that the text ‘furnishes no clear instance of dishonest or even 
questionable alteration’.  Unfortunately, the case Williams puts forward is far from 
convincing.  Thus he later appears to concede that, in this instance at least, Milton’s 
alterations are open to question, and even goes so far as to agree that ‘the charge [of 
dishonesty] would be justified if Milton had promised a faithful translation of Bucer’.  
However, he immediately goes on to insist – somewhat speciously – that the question 
does not actually arise since Milton ‘did not promise more than to show wherein 
Bucer agreed with his own already expressed opinions’.  Having cleared Milton of 
tampering with Bucer’s text by virtue of his not having explicitly undertaken not to 
tamper with it, Williams leniently concludes that ‘it would be nearer to the truth to say 
that Milton is here functioning as an advocate, not as a scholar’ (2: 420, 816-17) 
 Williams’s other main line of argument, rather at odds with the first, is flatly 
to deny that Milton did anything wrong at all.  In fact, the alteration to the passage 
 
 represents a correction of Bucer by Milton, who had probably already made 
 the intensive study of the Civil law on matrimony which figures so 
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 prominently in Tetrachordon.  Milton knew that Bucer’s statement needed 
 some qualification and proceeded to make it.  The matter of Justinian’s 
 revocation was less important; he would take care of that impious and 
 changeable emperor in Tetrachordon. (2: 811) 
 
This too begs several questions.  In the first place, Bucer does not actually make any 
mistakes requiring ‘correction’, and certainly none that requires the deletion of his 
perfectly correct statement about Justinian’s revocation.  Nor is the appeal to Milton’s 
later writings admissible.  Strictly speaking, this requires Milton already to have 
intended to write again on divorce and already to have had some plausible argument 
about Justinian in mind which would allow him to delete the phrase with a clear 
conscience.  But Milton clearly expected the Bucer translation to silence his critics 
once and for all, and it was only its failure to do so which elicited a further exposition 
of his views.  Neither can we infer from the relative familiarity with the Roman law 
which Milton displayed in Tetrachordon, published some seven months later in 
March 1645, what the state of his knowledge was at the time of the Bucer translation.  
This is moreover another topic on which Williams contradicts himself, asserting both 
that Milton had ‘probably already made an intensive study’ of the law before 
translating Bucer and that Bucer’s ‘evidence of the practice of the early church from 
some of its fathers and from Roman law probably came as a very useful discovery to 
Milton’ (2: 419).  In many ways, this is the nub of the issue, for it is only if Milton 
had studied Roman law beforehand that the liberties he took with Bucer appear 
excusable. 
 Nevertheless, the best place to begin is with Milton’s resolution of the 
problem in Tetrachordon.  Once again, he cited the permissive legislation of 
Theodosius and Valentinian, ‘pious emperors both’, but this time admitted that ‘In the 
117. Novell. … the liberty of divorcing by consent is repeal’d: but by whom? by 
Justinian, not a wiser, not a more religious emperor then either of the former, but 
noted by judicious writers for his fickle head in making and unmaking lawes’ (2: 700-
1).  This ad hominem thrust represents a complete change in Milton’s view of 
Justinian from that expressed in the first and second editions of The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce where, citing Grotius, he approvingly describes ‘the Christian 
Emperours, Theodosius the second, and Justinian’ as ‘men of high wisdom and 
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reputed piety’ (2: 334).  As recently as February 1644, therefore, Milton had seen no 
reason to differentiate between Theodosius and Justinian but thought of them as 
equally admirable.   
 Apart from this, Milton had two further convincing arguments to offer.  
Firstly, he pointed out that Justinian’s revocation had itself been revoked by his 
nephew and successor, Justin II in Novella 140, the effect being ‘to restore that 
Theodosian law’, which – to the best of Milton’s knowledge – ‘remain’d in force, as 
long as the Greek empire subsisted’ (2: 702).  Secondly, Milton made the no less 
telling claim that the original revocation had never had the force of law in the West 
because, insofar as any Roman law had obtained after the Germanic invasions, it had 
been the Codex Theodosianus (AD 439) and its Visigothic and Burgundian 
derivatives, and not the Justinianic codification.  This was shown by the absence from 
the West (it was thought) of any of Justinian’s texts with the exception of one 
manuscript of the Digest, the so-called Pisana or Pisan Pandects.  It was on the 
acquisition of this crucial text by Pisa in 1137 that Milton focused in a passage of 
historical argument, the remarkable breadth and subtlety of which distinguishes it 
from the mundane list of authorities in which it is embedded: 
 
 in these western parts of the empire it will appeare almost unquestionable that 
 the cited law of Theodosius and Valentinian stood in force untill the blindest 
 and corruptest times of Popedom displac’t it.  For that the volumes of 
 Justinian never came into Italy, or beyond Illiricum, is the opinion of good 
 Antiquaries.  And that only manuscript thereof found in Apulia by Lotharius 
 the Saxon, and giv’n to the state of Pisa for their aid at sea against the 
 Normans of Sicily, was receav’d as a rarity not to bee matcht.  And although 
 the Gothes, and after them the Lombards and Franks who over-run the most of 
 Europ except this Island (unless wee make our Saxons and Normans a limm of 
 them) brought in their owne customes, yet that they follow’d the Roman laws 
 in their contracts and mariages, Agathias the historian is alleg’d.  And other 
 testimonies relate that Alaricus & Theodoric their Kings writ their statutes out 
 of this Theodosian Code which hath the recited law of Divorce. (2: 704) 
 
Dzelzainis, ‘Milton and Roman Law’ 9
With this elegant finesse, Milton disposed of Justinian and realigned the course of 
events with the truths of history.  Justinian’s revocation of the Theodosian law of 
divorce was neither here nor there, not only because it had itself been revoked, but, 
more importantly, because the impact of Justinian’s codification of the law as a whole 
had been delayed in the West until the twelfth-century revival of Roman law studies 
which was associated above all with the Pisan manuscript of the Digest.  Thus, Milton 
triumphantly concluded, as far as ‘these western parts of the empire’ were concerned, 
it was not an emperor, Justinian, but, as one might have expected, a pope, Alexander 
III, who much later ‘first actually repeal’d the imperial law of divorce’ (2: 706). 
 The question thus assumes a precise form: was this solution to the problem 
something that was already known to Milton prior to translating the Bucer or was it 
something which he only came across in the course of working on Tetrachordon?  
Answering the question is a good deal less easy than framing it since it broaches a 
number of vexed issues in Milton studies. 
 The first of these is the chronology of Milton’s private studies, a Serbonian 
bog which badly needs draining.  A few examples will suffice to illustrate the chronic 
uncertainty and ignorance which prevails.  The long passage from Tetrachordon 
quoted above derives substantially from Leunclavius, Iuris Graeco-Romani.9  But 
when did Milton actually read it?  Hanford suggests probably after 1643 and, by 
inference, 1644;10 Ruth Mohl, less certainly, 1643-44 (see 1: 401); and W. R. Parker, 
more generally still, 1642-45.11  Or when did Milton inscribe the verses about 
Justinian in his copy of Harington’s Ariosto?  John Carey suggests around 1632, that 
is, ‘nearer to [Milton’s] renunciation of the legal profession in Ad patrem’.12  (Of 
course, the date of Ad patrem is itself in dispute.13)  The Columbia editors, however, 
prefer 1642 since that is when Milton, in a separate inscription, dates his reading of 
Harington.14  The dates do make a difference to how the line is read; the earlier one, 
1632, invests it with all the vehemence attending Milton’s rejection of the law; the 
                                                 
9 See J. Leunclavius, Iuris Graeco-Romani tam Canonici quam Civilis Tomi duo (Frankfurt, 1596), 
sigs. iiiv-iiiv (dedicatory epistle). 
10 See J. H. Hanford, ‘The Chronology of Milton’s Private Studies’, Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America, 36 (1921), p. 277. 
11 See W. R. Parker, Milton: A Biography, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1968), II: 882-3.  
12 Milton, Shorter Poems, p. 155. 
13 See now Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography (Oxford, 2000), pp. 71, 
568. 
14 See The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank A. Patterson et al., 18 vols (New York, 1931-8), 18: 605. 
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later, 1642, suggests more a respite from sterner labours in the spirit of, say, the 
‘cheerful hour’ of Sonnet 18: ‘Let Euclid rest and Archimedes pause’.15  We also 
know that Milton made entries about slavery from Justinian’s Institutes in his 
Commonplace Book (see I: 410, 411, 426, 438, 470, 471).  But when?  Hanford 
comments that the ‘fact that Milton makes no citations on divorce, though he had 
evidently carefully studies the subject in the Institutes before writing Tetrachordon 
(1644/45) … points to a date before 1643 for these entries’.16  It may be that these 
entries date from 1643, but this cannot be because they fail to mention divorce for the 
simple reason there is next to nothing on divorce in the Institutes!  In Martin Bucer, 
Milton certainly sounds as if he has read more widely in the Roman law, announcing 
ostentatiously that he will not follow Bucer in reciting the ‘causes wherfore a wife 
might send a divorce to her husband’: ‘I set them down not beeing easie to be found in 
the body of the civil Law’ (2: 469).17  All this bears out Fletcher’s complaints about 
the lack of serious study; more ominously, it means that no argument that depends on 
the supposed date of entries in the Commonplace Book can be entirely secure. 
 Another vexed issue is Milton’s alleged access to another source of 
specialized knowledge; namely, the manuscripts of John Selden prior to their 
publication--in this case, the manuscript of Selden’s Uxor Ebraica (first published in 
1646), which lays out the sequence of imperial legislation on the topic of divorce.18    
Eivion Owen speculates that Milton must have read Selden’s work in manuscript 
‘towards the end of April 1644’.19  And it is on the basis of this speculation that Jason 
Rosenblatt has more recently advanced the hypothesis that when Milton was 
preparing Pro populo Anglicano defensio (1651) he also had access to not only the 
                                                 
15 Milton, Sonnet 18, ll. 7, 14 (Shorter Poems, pp. 411-12). 
16 Hanford, ‘Chronology’, p. 277. 
17 How ‘easie’ it would be to locate the material ‘in the body of the civil Law’ would depend on the 
scholarly apparatus of the edition of the Corpus Juris Civilis being used.  In Corpus Juris Civilis in IIII. 
partes distinctum, 4 vols (Geneva, 1594, 1595), for example, Code V.17.8, Novella 117, and Novella 
140 are mutually cross-referenced (see II: col. 406, col. 275 (second pagination), col. 347 (should be 
348; third pagination).  This apparatus is absent from, for example, the 1575 Antwerp and 1576 Paris 
editions.  However, we still do not know which edition Milton used.  Kester Svendsen, the Yale editor 
of Milton’s Pro Se Defensio, does however point out (4: 713) that, whichever it was, it must have been 
one in which the text of Institutes IV.4.1 indicated that the phrase ‘aut historiam’ was suspect.  This is 
the case in, for example, the 1575 Antwerp, 1587 Geneva, 1587 Frankfurt, 1594, 1595 Geneva, and 
1627 Leyden editions, but not in the 1576 Paris and 1608 Lyons ones.    
18 The relevant material is found in Book III, chapters 28-30: see Ioannis Seldeni Uxor Ebraica, seu De 
nuptiis & divortiis ex iure civili, id est, divino &Talmudico, veterum Ebraeorum, libri tres (London, 
1646), pp. 557-90; Jonathan R. Ziskind, John Selden on Jewish Marriage Law: the Uxor Ebraica 
translated with a commentary (Leiden, 1991), pp. 462-85.  
19 Eivion Owen, ‘Milton and Selden on Divorce’, Studies in Philology, 43 (1946), p. 241.  
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first instalment of Selden’s De Synedriis, printed in 1650, but also to the manuscript 
of the two parts not published until 1653 and 1655.20  But all of this is no more than 
conjecture upon conjecture,21 and even Owen concedes that if Milton read in Uxor 
Ebraica in manuscript then he did so ‘without consulting’ the relevant chapter on the 
civil law.22 
 Nevertheless, there is some evidence which suggests that, even before 
translating Bucer, Milton knew something of the Pisana and its historical 
significance, and that he owed this knowledge in part to Selden’s work--though it was 
to his published rather than his unpublished writings. 
 In a somewhat baffling passage in the second edition of The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, Milton refers to ‘that noble volume written by our learned 
Selden, Of the law of nature & of Nations’.  Selden’s work, he says, is far superior to 
 
 all those decretals, and sumles sums, which the Pontificial Clerks have doted 
 on, ever since that unfortunat mother famously sinn’d thrice, and dy’d 
 impenitent of her bringing into the world those two misbegott’n infants, & for 
 ever infants Lombard & Gratian, him the compiler of Canon iniquity, tother 
 the Tubalcain of scholastick Sophistry, whose overspreading barbarism hath 
 … infus’d their own bastardy upon the fruitfullest part of human learning … 
 and dejected the clear light of nature in us, & of nations… (2: 350-1) 
 
                                                 
20 Rosenblatt first suggested this possibility in ‘Milton’s Chief Rabbi’, Milton Studies, 24 (1988), pp. 
43-71, and again in revised form in Torah and Law in ‘Paradise Lost’ (Princeton, 1994), pp. 82-97.   In 
the latter, Rosenblatt does not repeat in so many words the claim that ‘Just as Milton drew upon the 
manuscript of Uxor Ebraica in Tetrachordon, so does he draw here [in Pro populo Anglicano 
Defensio] upon the manuscript of the other two books of De Synedriis’ (‘Milton’s Chief Rabbi’, pp. 54-
5). 
21 Without exception, the quotations from rabbinical materials in Milton’s Defensio upon which 
Rosenblatt dilates can be found in either the work to which Milton was replying, Salmasius’s Defensio 
regia (1649), or a work from which Milton earlier made an entry in his Commonplace Book (see 1: 
460), Wilhelm Schickhard’s Mishpat ha-Melekh, Jus Regium Hebraeorum e Tenebris Rabbinicis 
Erutum & Luci Donatum (Strasburg, 1625)--and sometimes in both: see John Milton, Political 
Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 85, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96.  Milton’s extensive use 
of Schickhard’s Jus Regium was first noted by J. B. Carpzov in the second edition (Leipzig, 1674), pp. 
149, 164,   
22 Owen, ‘Milton and Selden’, p. 255. 
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Milton is here alluding to the medieval legend that Gratian, Peter Lombard, and Peter 
Comestor were bastard brothers--the illegitimate offspring of an unrepentant mother.23  
It is rather striking that this legend is rehearsed in praise of Selden since, although 
Selden had not mentioned this fiction in the 1640 De iure naturali, he did do so in the 
preface to the first edition of his Titles of Honor (1614).  There Selden refers to 
 
 the two Bastard brothers (by whose worth, and of the third, Peter Comestor, 
 their Mother thought shee should bee sau’d, neither would repent, but trusted 
 to hir merit in bearing three so famous) Gratian a monk in Bologna, and Peter 
 Lombard at Paris, one made the Decree, the first Volume autorised for Canon 
 Law by Pope Eugenius III, and the other the Sentences.24 
 
The structure and phrasing of this, together with the focus on Gratian and Lombard to 
the virtual exclusion of Comestor, was all echoed by Milton in 1644 when fashioning 
his compliment to Selden. 
 More importantly, this passage about the bastard brothers in Selden’s preface 
follows an account of the twelfth-century revival of Roman law studies and an attack 
on the glossators’ 
 
 impudent barbarisme in the Glosses on so neat a text, which from Iustinian 
 (hee died DLXV. [565] vntill Lothar II. (hee was Emperor CI[reversed C] 
 .C.XXV. [1125] lay hidden and out of vse in the Western Empire, nor did anie 
 there, all that time, professe or read it.  But when Lothar took Amalfi, hee 
 there found an old Copie of the Pandects or Digests, which hee gaue as a 
 precious Monument to the Pisans (hence it was called Litera Pisana) from 
 whom it hath been since (in CI[reversed C] .CD.XC.VI. [1406]) translated to 
                                                 
23 The legend was routinely denied by Catholic scholars: see, for example, R. Bellarmine, De 
Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticus (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1613), p. 340, and Guido Pancirolli, De Claris 
Legum Interpretibus (Venice, 1637), p. 405. 
24 John Selden, Titles of Honor (London, 1614), sigs. d4v-A1. 
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 Florence, where, in the Dukes Palace, it is, almost with Religion, preserued, 
 and neuer brought forth but with Torches, Light, and other reuerence.25 
 
Selden’s account, which also derives in part from Leunclavius, may underlie the 
corresponding one in Tetrachordon (where, after all, Milton does refer to the ‘opinion 
of good Antiquaries’ plural).   But the more important allusion is the one in the 1644 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce because this would mean that even before Milton 
came across Bucer he was already in possession of the argument that he was later to 
deploy so effectively against Justinian to the effect that the texts of the Roman law 
‘lay hidden and out of vse in the Western Empire’ for more than 500 years. 
 Selden also revealed that the Pisana had been in Florence since 1406, and 
hence was known to renaissance scholars as the Florentina or Florentine Pandects.  
This fact was routinely recorded in the standard itineraries and guides: Schott, Merula, 
Borrelli, and Pflaumer.26  When John Evelyn, for example, visited Florence in 
October 1644, he echoed Pflaumer in noting that ‘In the Chapell [of the Palazzo 
Vecchio] is conserv’d … the Originall Gospel of St John, writen with his owne hand; 
together with the so famous Florentine Pandects’.27  We should remember that 
throughout his Italian journey Milton showed a keen interest in libraries and 
manuscripts.  Not only did he visit the Vatican library, but Lukas Holste, one of the 
librarians, commissioned him to inspect a ‘Medicean codex’ at Florence.  Milton 
suggested to Holste that Giovanni Battista Doni (who possibly attended meetings of 
the Svogliati at which Milton was present) might be better placed to gain access to it  
(1: 334-5).  Moreover, both Doni and Carlo Dati, another of Milton’s friends, 
                                                 
25 Selden, Titles of Honor, sig. d4.  See also Selden, Notes upon Sir Iohn Fortescue Knight, L. Chiefe 
Iustice of England, De laudibus legum Angliae (London, 1616), pp. 20-22, and The Historie of Tithes 
(n.p., 1618), p. 481.  Selden discussed the period between the promulgation of the Theodosian Code 
and the revival of Roma law studies much more extensively in the historical dissertation which he 
appended to his edition of Fleta, seu, Commentarius juris Anglicani (London, 1647): see David Ogg, 
Ioannis Seldeni Ad Fletam Dissertatio. Reprinted from the edition of 1647, with parallel translation, 
introduction and notes (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 54-103.  However, it should be noted that Selden 
categorically denies at the start of the following chapter (pp. 102-5) that the Theodosian Code was ever 
used in Britain after the end of the Roman occupation, and maintains that the Anglo-Saxon invaders 
relied exclusively on their native customs.     
26 See F. Schott, Itinerari Italiae Rerumque Romanorum Libri Tres (Antwerp, 1600), pp. 279-80; P. 
Merula, Cosmographiae generalis libri tres (Amsterdam, 1605), pp. 894-5; C. Borrelli, De Regis 
Catholici Praestantia (Milan, 1611), pp. 524-5; J. Pflaumer, Mercurius Italicus (Aug. Vind., 1625), p. 
105.   
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successively occupied the chair of Greek at Florence originally held by Angelo 
Poliziano.  Indeed, Dati told Milton in 1648 that he felt particularly honoured to be 
following in Poliziano’s footsteps (see 2: 774).  Among the most significant of 
Poliziano’s many accomplishments was that he was the first scholar to apply humanist 
techniques of scholarship to the Florentina, and his remarks in his Letters and 
Miscellanies were constantly cited in discussions of the Digest.28   Another of 
Milton’s Italian acquaintances, Agostino Coltellini, founder of the Apatisti, had 
studied law at Pisa before practising in Florence.29  It is virtually inconceivable that 
Milton could have spent four months in Florentine humanist circles without either 
seeing this precious manuscript for himself or at least hearing about it and its 
provenance from others.  Moreover, it may well be that Milton travelled to Florence 
in the hope that it would be one of the things he would be able to see for himself.  In 
the 1637 letter to Diodati in which he revealed his plan to move into one of the Inns of 
Court, he also disclosed that he had been ‘occupied for a long time by the obscure 
history of the Italians under the Longobards, Franks, and Germans’ (1, 327).  This 
was precisely the period covered by a book from which Milton made several entries in 
the Commonplace Book, Sigonius’s De Regno Italiae, and in which, under the year 
1137, Sigonius rehearsed the movements of the manuscript of the Digest from Amalfi 
to Pisa to Florence.30 
 All this makes it highly unlikely that Milton’s handling of Bucer’s text was in 
bad faith.  However, we can be certain that the episode etched itself in his mind since 
we can hear echoes of it in his other writings.  Thus in A Brief History of Moscovia 
Milton departs from his sources to comment upon Muscovite divorces: ‘Upon utter 
dislike, the Husband divorces; which Liberty no doubt they receiv’d first with their 
Religion from the Greek Church, and the Imperial Laws’ (8: 493-4).  To account for 
this liberal social practice, Milton resorts to the same finesse as in Tetrachordon; that 
is to say, constructing a cultural genealogy which bypasses the medieval papacy.  
                                                                                                                                            
27 The Diary of John Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1955), II, 188.  The Florentina was 
transferred to the Laurentian Library in 1786: see Digesta Iustiniani Augusti, ed. T. Mommsen, 2 vols. 
(Berlin, 1868-70), I: xii. 
28 See A. Grafton, ‘On the Scholarship of Politian and its Contexts, Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), pp. 167-8.  For his comments on the Florentina, see Angeli Politiani 
Opera (Basle, 1553), pp 140-41, 260-61, 287. 
29 For Coltellini, see now Lewalski, Life of John Milton, p. 573. 
30 See I: 444, 478, 489, and C. Sigonius, Historiarum de regno Italiae Libri Viginti (Frankfurt, 1596), 
p. 270.  Sigonius is one of the sources cited in Selden’s Titles of Honor and Leunclavius’s Ius Graeco-
Romani.   
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Similarly, when Milton pointed out in the first edition of The Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates (February 1649) that the same Theodosius had ‘causd it to be enacted … 
that a Prince is bound to the Laws’, he felt compelled to add that this ‘Edict of his 
remains yet unrepeald in the Code of Justinian’, later entering exactly the same 
proviso in Eikonoklastes (October 1649): ‘it was decreed by Theodosius, and stands 
yet firme in the Code of Justinian, that the Law is above the Emperour’ (3: 206, 590). 
It is hardly surprising that Milton cited this edict, the so-called ‘Digna vox’, since it 
was regularly referred to in sixteenth-century writings on resistance theory: Martin 
Bucer, George Buchanan, and the author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos all mention 
it.31  But the emphasis on its not having been repealed by Justinian is distinctly odd.32  
I for one cannot see where this nervous display of scholarly scruple had its origins 
other than in Milton’s earnest deliberations during the summer of 1644 on what to do 
about Martin Bucer and Justinian.   
 
  
 
                                                 
31 See Milton, Political Writings, p. 13. 
32 In the second edition of The Tenure, however, Milton deleted ‘unrepeald’. 
